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Abstract 
Exploiting the unique feature that Latin American countries have not undergone a significant 
change to the enforcement of accounting standards and investor protection mechanisms, we 
investigate whether mandatory adoption of IFRS and firm-level reporting incentives improve 
analysts’ information environment in Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico and Peru), and whether the precision of public, private and consensus information 
improve after IFRS adoption. Test results show that mandatory adoption of IFRS and firm-level 
reporting incentives improve analysts’ information environment. Overall, we confirm the 
positive effects of IFRS adoption, because the precision of public and consensus information is 
enhanced. 
 
Keywords: IFRS, analysts’ information environment, forecast accuracy, target price 
forecast dispersion, investor protection mechanisms 
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1.  Introduction 
Ball (2006) and Byard et al. (2011) argue that mandatory adoption of IFRS has 
the potential to improve the transparency of financial reports, facilitate cross-border 
investment, reduce information asymmetry, and contribute to the efficiency of the 
markets. These benefits rely on the presumption that, under IFRS, firms are required to 
provide high-quality information to investors, which implies greater comparability than 
domestic accounting standards (Horton et al., 2013). High-quality information may also 
benefit analysts (Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001), as their forecast accuracy may increase 
and the dispersion of their forecasts may reduce in the post-adoption period. Consistent 
with this view, past studies report an improvement in analysts’ information environment 
following the mandatory adoption of IFRS in countries where there is strong 
enforcement of accounting standards (e.g. Byard et al., 2011; Horton et al., 2013; 
Houqe et al., 2014). However, the mandatory adoption of IFRS may not be the only 
factor responsible for improving analysts’ information environment, as managers’ 
incentives, the enforcement of accounting standards, and a country’s investor protection 
mechanisms can also affect the information environment (see among others Byard et al., 
2011; Houqe et al., 2014; Preiato et al., 2015). Byard et al. (2011) report that IFRS only 
improves analysts’ information environment in countries where the enforcement is 
strong. They also report that analysts’ forecast accuracy improves more for firms that 
have incentives to adopt IFRS under the institutional settings of weak enforcement and 
greater disparity between domestic GAAP and IFRS. Houqe et al. (2014) also find an 
improvement in analysts’ forecast accuracy in European countries with low investor 
protection mechanisms, but their sample is composed of countries that have strong 
enforcement of accounting standards (Brown et al., 2014). Byard et al. (2011) rely on  
Kaufmann et al. (2007)’s proxy for the quality of countries’ legal and enforcement 
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regimes. This is not the latest proxy for the sampling period after 2010. Moreover, 
Preiato et al. (2015) argue that the enforcement may change over time, as countries are 
likely to strengthen the enforcement of the accounting standards over the years. This 
casts doubt over previous literature, and we therefore argue that it is necessary to review 
the enforcement in each country regularly and adjust the related indexes accordingly. 
This method is also helpful to avoid the bundle effect of enforcement and the effect of 
IFRS adoption (Christensen et al., 2013). 
In contrast to earlier literatures that investigate the impact of IFRS adoption on 
analysts’ information environment in developed nations, we focus on Latin American 
countries, because their unique institutional setting could provide new insight to the 
IFRS literature. Previous literature has documented that the strength of the enforcement 
of accounting standards and investor protection mechanisms may change according to 
the progress of the implementation of IFRS (Brown et al., 2014), which makes it 
difficult to isolate the IFRS adoption effect from other institutional effects. Therefore, to 
pinpoint the IFRS adoption effect we evaluate in this paper the strength of the 
institutional settings as well as if they have not changed significantly between the pre- 
and post-IFRS adoption periods. We reach this objective by issuing a questionnaire 
about several aspects regarding enforcement of accounting standards and investor 
protection mechanisms to each country’s securities market regulator, which is available 
at appendix 1 and discussed in the research design of this paper. The results of the 
questionnaire show that these institutional settings in Latin American countries are 
weak and there has been no change around the IFRS adoption dates. Therefore, 
investigating the effect of IFRS adoption on these countries helps to mitigate the 
bundle-effect issue (Christensen et al., 2013), and addresses the concern of whether the 
benefits documented by previous research are due to stricter enforcement, or due to the 
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IFRS adoption (Preiato et al., 2015). Additionally, unlike other countries, firms in Latin 
America are required to adopt IFRS in separate financial statements as well as in 
consolidated financial statements.
1
 Thus, the different reporting regime and the unique 
institutional settings of Latin American countries allows us to pinpoint the effects of 
IFRS and firm-level reporting incentives more accurately in comparison with previous 
studies (e.g. Byard et al., 2011; Tan et al., 2011; Houqe et al., 2014; Preiato et al., 
2015). 
We conjecture that the adoption of IFRS could improve analysts’ information 
environment in the long-term, even in Latin American countries where the institutional 
settings are weak. There are two reasons that support our assumption. Firstly, previous 
domestic accounting standards were designed to attend tax and government needs, 
which were not adequately prepared to inform investors, analysts, and other market 
participants
2
. This environment may also affect the performance of analysts, as earnings 
forecasts tend to have a higher bias in countries with low investor protection 
mechanisms (Hovakimian and Saenyasiri, 2014). Aiming to change this poor 
environment, the regulators of these countries expect mandatory adoption of IFRS to 
improve firms’ accounting quality, and thereby enhance the transparency and reliability 
of financial statements, which would subsequently improve its usefulness for external 
users such as analysts and investors. As IFRS is market-oriented in comparison with 
previous standards, the financial statements derived under these standards should 
benefit more investors and analysts due to the improved accounting quality of Latin 
American firms (García et al., 2017), which would eventually better allow analysts to 
                                               
1
 The exception is in Argentina where firms have the choice to adopt IAS 27 from August 2014 or to 
disclose equity holdings in subsidiaries and affiliates according to Technical Resolution 26 of FACPCE 
(Argentine Federation of professionals of economics). In Mexico, however, firms are not required to 
adopt IFRS in separate financial statements. The information can be retrieved from 
http://www.ifrs.org/Use-around-the-world/Documents/Jurisdiction-profiles.  
2 For details of the differences between domestic accounting standards and IFRS, see Bae et al. (2008).   
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shape their forecasts. Secondly, these countries have faced a recession since the 
financial crisis during mid-2007, with increasing debt and stagnant GDP growth in the 
years around the IFRS adoption (IMF 2015). Firms in these countries need to rely more 
than ever before on both domestic and foreign investors to provide sources of funding. 
Thus, the adoption of IFRS is an opportunity for firms to disclose high-quality 
accounting in order to attract investors and expand their coverage by international 
analysts, which would facilitate the capital market development (De la Torre and 
Schmukler, 2006). This argument finds its support from the signalling theory, as firms 
can signal the quality of their equity to investors by disclosing extra information and 
adopting additional mechanisms when the cost to relay and verify the information is 
high (Barth et al., 2008), which is the case in countries with weak institutional settings
3
. 
Furthermore, according to the bonding theory, countries with weak investor protection 
mechanisms may have incentives to adopt IFRS in order to improve the comparability 
of financial information (Hope et al., 2006). This is because they want to “bond” the 
higher quality of financial statements to their weak institutional setting, in order to 
attract investments and increase investors’ confidence (Hope et al., 2006). This 
argument is also consistent with an increase in foreign direct investment in these 
countries in recent years from the U.S., China and Germany (IMF 2015). Additionally, 
gradually more Latin American firms will cross-list in foreign exchange markets, and 
likely improve their investment and cash decisions (Ghosh and He, 2015). As such, we 
expect that analysts will take advantage of the increased accounting quality, which will 
lead to more accurate and less dispersed forecasts.  
                                               
3 Investors perceive a greater risk in investing in companies where the investor protection mechanisms are 
weak, and as such, companies with strong reporting incentives can disclose more information to mitigate 
information asymmetry problems and attract investments.  
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We study five countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru,
4
 across the 
sampling period from 2003 to 2015
5
. To achieve our research objectives, we firstly 
examine whether the mandatory adoption of IFRS in these countries has improved 
analysts’ information environment, measured in terms of analysts’ forecast accuracy of 
earnings, the forecast dispersion of earnings, the forecast dispersion of target price, and 
whether there are more analysts following Latin American firms in the post-adoption 
period. Analysing these countries better allows us to investigate more accurately the 
effect of IFRS and firms’ incentives, in contrast with several earlier studies (e.g. Byard 
et al., 2011; Horton et al., 2013; Preiato et al., 2015), and mitigate the “bundle effect” 
issue (Christensen et al., 2013). Thus, we next evaluate whether firm-level reporting 
incentives alone, or the effect of both IFRS and firm-level reporting incentives, can 
affect the information environment. Third, in order to evaluate whether any 
improvement in analysts’ information environment is really derived from the adoption 
of IFRS, we measure whether the precision of public and private information increased 
after the adoption of IFRS, following the approach suggested by Barron et al. (1998). 
To achieve our objectives of investigating the long-term effect of IFRS, in contrast with 
previous literature we compare the measures of analysts’ information environment in 
the four years before and the four years after the official date of mandatory adoption of 
IFRS.   
This study makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, to the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first study examining the impact of IFRS on analysts’ 
information environment in Latin American countries. It addresses the demand of the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) for research investigating the impact 
                                               
4 The mandatory adoption date for publicly listed firms to adopt IFRS was on: 1st January 2012, 31st 
December 2010, 31st December 2009, 1st January 2012, and 1st January 2012 respectively for Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru. We check manually firm by firm for the accurate adoption date, as some 
of the firms were given a grace period to adopt IFRS.  
5 The other Latin American countries are not included due to data availability. 
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of IFRS in developing economies. Second, unlike previous literature, this study 
measures the long-term effect of the mandatory IFRS adoption. Third, it shows that 
improvements to the analysts’ information environment arise due to IFRS, which is 
denoted in the increased precision of public and consensus information. Fourth, our 
research design allows us to better investigate the sole effect of IFRS adoption on 
analysts’ information environment and firm-level reporting incentives, as the adoption 
of IFRS in these countries is not bundled with changes in enforcement and investor 
protection mechanisms. Fifth, our metrics of analysts’ information environment are also 
based on target price forecasts, in contrast with previous research that focuses solely on 
earnings forecasts (e.g. Byard et al., 2011; Horton et al., 2013; Preiato et al., 2015). We 
believe our results shall be of interest and use to the IASB, regulators, and investment 
community. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents review of 
relevant literature and hypotheses development. Section 3 presents the research design. 
Section 4 describes the data and sampling procedures. Section 5 discusses the results. 
Lastly, Section 6 concludes this study. 
 
2.  Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
The prime objective of this study is to examine whether mandatory adoption of 
IFRS can improve the quality of analysts’ information environment in Latin American 
countries whose institutional settings of enforcement and investor protection are weak. 
We conjecture that there is a positive effect of mandatory adoption of IFRS on the 
quality of analysts’ information environment measured in terms of analysts’ forecast 
accuracy, number of analysts following firms, dispersion of earnings forecasts, and 
dispersion of target price forecasts. This is because, first, regulators in Latin America 
  
Page 8 of 59 
 
expect that IFRS adoption will increase the transparency and accounting quality of 
financial statements, in contrast with those prepared according to domestic accounting 
standards (see Fortin et al. (2010) for a discussion around this)
6
. Thus, as regulators 
expect accounting quality to improve in the post-adoption period, the accuracy of 
earnings forecasts should improve as well (see Li et al., 2017). Second, previous 
literature suggests that countries with a big gap between local standards and IFRS, 
which is the case of Latin American countries, should present a bigger improvement in 
accounting quality, which in turn would improve analysts’ forecast accuracy (Bae et al., 
2008; Byard et al., 2011). As Latin American firms are required to provide accounting 
information in higher quantity and quality under IFRS in comparison to previous 
domestic standards, the financial statements will be more transparent, consistent, and 
comparable, and analysts’ earnings forecasts are likely to become more precise. Thus, 
the first hypothesis is: 
H1a: The accuracy of earnings forecasts increased following mandatory 
adoption of IFRS in Latin America. 
As argued above, mandatory adoption of IFRS can increase the comparability and 
consistency of accounting information (e.g. Jones and Finley, 2011; Cascino and 
Gassen, 2015). Thus, analysts can compare firms’ financial statements worldwide as 
they are based on the same accounting standards, which shall help to improve their 
forecast accuracy and reduce the dispersion of their forecasts (Tan et al., 2011; Houqe et 
                                               
6 More information on the expectations of each countries’ securities market regulator can be found at the 
following websites: Argentina (Comisión Nacional de Valores (CNV)), which is available at 
http://www.cnv.gob.ar/leyesyreg/cnv/esp/rgc562-09.htm; Brazil (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários 
(CVM)), which is available at www.cvm.gov.br/export/sites/cvm/legislacao/deli/anexos/0500/ 
deli565.doc; Chile (Superintendencia Valores y Seguros (SVS)), which is available at http://www.svs.cl/ 
sitio/legislacion_normativa/normativa/doc/ofc_368_2006.pdf; Mexico (Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de 
Valores (CNBV)), which is available athttp://www.iasplus.com/en/binary/americas/0811cnbvenglish.pdf;  
Peru (Comisión Nacional Supervisora de Empresas y Valores (CONASEV)), which is available at 
http://www.iasplus.com/en/binary/americas/1012peruconasev.pdf 
  
Page 9 of 59 
 
al., 2014). As such, the disagreement among them is likely to reduce. We therefore set 
the following hypothesis: 
H1b: The dispersion of earnings forecasts reduced following mandatory 
adoption of IFRS in Latin America. 
According to Lang and Lundholm (1996), more analysts will follow a firm if its 
accounting quality improves. Additionally, mandatory IFRS adoption may reduce 
analysts’ time and effort in acquiring and processing firms’ information (Byard et al., 
2011; Tan et al., 2011; Houqe et al., 2014). This reduces the costs and barriers for 
foreign analysts to cover more firms across the world, and as such more analysts are 
likely to follow Latin American firms in the post-adoption period.  Thus, the hypothesis 
is: 
H1c: The number of analysts following firms increased following mandatory 
adoption of IFRS in Latin America. 
Unlike previous research that investigates the impact of the IFRS adoption on 
analysts’ information environment by using earnings forecasts only (Byard et al., 2011; 
Horton et al., 2013; Preiato et al., 2015), we expand the measures of analysts’ 
information environment by also investigating the effect of IFRS on target price 
forecasts. We conjecture that the disagreement among analysts’ target price forecasts 
will decline in the post-IFRS adoption period. Firstly, this is because mandatory 
adoption of IFRS might improve the accounting quality, and thus analysts would 
generally have more high-quality information available from the financial statements. 
As firms need to disclose more information due to the IFRS requirements, the 
information asymmetry among firms and investors is expected to decline. This helps 
analysts to shape their target price forecast. As such, considering that analysts rely on 
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the financial statements to issue their forecasts (Loh and Mian, 2006), high-quality 
information and lower information asymmetry would help to reduce the dispersion of 
the forecasts (Horton et al., 2013). Secondly, earnings forecasts are one of the key 
inputs for predicting target price (Loh and Mian, 2006), and IFRS leads to higher 
disclosure and transparency, which enables analysts to issue earnings forecasts that are 
more accurate and less dispersed, and disagreement in issuing target price should 
decrease among analysts. Thus, the hypothesis is as follows: 
H1d: The dispersion of target price forecast has declined following 
mandatory adoption of IFRS in Latin America. 
Our second objective is to investigate whether firm-level incentives on the 
implementation of IFRS affect analysts’ information environment. Previous studies 
report that the effects of the adoption of IFRS may be due to firms’ incentives, 
enforcement of accounting standards, and investor protection mechanisms (e.g. Byard et 
al., 2011; Christensen et al., 2013). As the institutional setting of Latin American 
countries is weak, there are opportunities for managers using their discretion on the 
implementation of IFRS. Under these institutional settings, to attract investments, we 
conjecture that firms with stronger reporting incentives may provide more information 
than firms with weaker reporting incentives. This assumption is based on the signalling 
theory, in which firms can signal the quality of their equity to investors by disclosing 
more information (Barth et al., 2008). This helps to reduce the investors’ perception of 
risk in investing in companies located in countries with weak institutional settings. 
Therefore, we set the following hypothesis: 
H2: Analysts’ information environment improved more for firms with 
stronger incentives to adopt IFRS in Latin America.  
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As analysts derive and process public and private information to generate their 
forecasts (Kim et al., 2017), the third objective of this paper is to investigate how 
mandatory adoption of IFRS affects the precision of public information, private 
information, or both. This is to evaluate whether any improvement in analysts’ 
information environment is reflected in greater precision arising from public 
information derived under IFRS. According to Byard et al. (2011), IFRS adoption may 
increase the quality of public information, as firms are required to disclose more 
information in comparison to domestic standards. As the quantity and quality of 
accounting information are likely to increase (Ball, 2006; Barth et al., 2008), the public 
information contained in financial statements could lead to an improvement in the 
precision of analysts’ forecasts (Horton et al., 2013). Thus, we predict that IFRS 
adoption would lead to an improvement in the precision of public information. We also 
predict an improvement in the precision of public information in comparison to all 
available information (consensus) (Barron et al., 1998). Therefore, the hypotheses are as 
follows: 
H3a: The precision of public information is higher following mandatory 
adoption of IFRS in Latin America. 
H3b: The precision of consensus information is higher following mandatory 
adoption of IFRS in Latin America.  
 
3.    Research design 
In this section, we first discuss the questionnaire issued to each country’s 
security market regulator to investigate whether the institutional settings have changed 
around IFRS adoption. Secondly, we also discuss the results of the questionnaire in this 
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section as it affects the econometric design of our research presented in the following 
sections. Thirdly, we present the four metrics (earnings forecast accuracy, dispersion of 
earnings forecasts, number of analysts following firms, and dispersion of target price 
forecasts) used to evaluate analysts’ information environment. Then we discuss the 
econometric methods used to evaluate whether IFRS has contributed to improve the 
analysts’ information environment, as well as whether firm-level incentives improve the 
analysts’ information environment. Finally, this section reports the methods to calculate 
the precision of public, private and consensus information, and the analysis employed to 
evaluate whether IFRS has contributed or not to improve these. 
3.1 Questionnaire – Changes in institutional settings 
The design of the questionnaire is based on La Porta et al. (1998), Hope (2003), 
the World Bank (2008)
7
 report on the observance of standards and codes, and Brown et 
al. (2014); the questionnaire is presented in Appendix 1. Firstly, the questionnaire was 
prepared in the local language of the target countries, and it was pre-tested (pilot tested) 
with native speakers in order to ascertain whether the questions were clear. Secondly, 
the questionnaire was uploaded to Google's forms in order to guarantee the consistency 
of its format for respondents in Latin American countries, and to allow a quicker and 
easier way for respondents to reply. It has two sections: the first section deals with 
enforcement of accounting standards; the second section focuses on the level of investor 
protection. We investigate the institutional setting by evaluating the current level of 
enforcement and investor protection of these countries as well as if they have changed 
around the IFRS adoption. 
                                               
7
 World Bank. (2008) Report on the observance of standards and codes (ROSC) [online]. Available from: 
http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/Part%20I%20--
%20Review%20of%20the%20Accounting%20and%20Auditing%20Environment.pdf.  
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At section one, questions 1 and 2 are based on Brown et al. (2014) and address 
whether there is a government body or a regulator monitoring the financial reporting of 
public companies. The third question is based on the work of Hope (2003); it addresses 
whether there were any companies that did not follow the IFRS guidelines even under 
mandatory adoption. Questions 4, 5 and 6 are designed based on the World Bank (2008) 
report. Questions 4 and 5 are designed to discover the penalties or consequences that 
each country issues for firms and managers if they do not comply with accounting rules 
in force. Moreover, it also helps to identify when the country enacted these rules. 
Emerging markets may only have enacted these laws more recently in comparison with 
developed markets. This is due to the level of development of local stock markets in 
comparison with those in developed markets. Question 6 investigates whether these 
penalties turned to be stricter after the adoption of IFRS. Question 7 is based on the rule 
of law of Hope (2003) and addresses whether the regulator has taken judicial action 
against a firm’s non-compliant financial statement. Finally, the last question of the 
enforcement section measures whether there was an increase in the number of staff 
members responsible for monitoring the statements of public companies. This question 
is designed based on the enforcement index of Brown et al. (2014).  
At the investor protection section, questions 9 to 19 are designed based on La 
Porta et al. (1998) and Hope (2003). Question 9 seeks the answer to the type of 
shareholder voting system in each country as the voting mechanism could be 
unbalanced (shares that have more voting rights) or balanced (one-share-one-vote). La 
Porta et al. (1998) argue that the preferred mechanism to ensure the investor protection 
is the one-share-one-vote system. This is preferable because there are companies that 
issue nonvoting shares, founders’ shares with extreme voting rights and shares that may 
have more voting rights according to the period for which one shareholder has held 
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them. Thus, the one-share-one-vote system is preferable in order to guarantee equal and 
democratic rights. Questions 10 and 11 focus on the easiness of the voting system; they 
investigate whether the shareholder can vote through the mail or if the shareholder 
needs to present himself at the shareholders’ meeting in order to be eligible to vote. The 
shareholders’ protection is higher if there are fewer constraints within the voting 
system. Question 12 evaluates whether the minority shareholders have any right to 
challenge a director’s decision in court; if they have the right to challenge his decisions, 
this is a sign of higher shareholder protection. Question 13 focuses on the minimum 
requirement of share capital needed in order to call for a shareholder meeting. A lower 
percentage of share capital needed indicates higher investor protection. That is, as the 
requirement is lower, shareholders can exercise their rights with greater ease. Question 
14 evaluates whether there is a minimum mandatory dividend. La Porta et al. (1998) 
argue that countries with low investor protection mechanisms may require a minimum 
mandatory dividend in order to guarantee investors’ rights. Thus, countries with 
stronger investor protection mechanisms may not require a minimum mandatory 
dividend because they have other mechanisms to safeguard the investors’ interests. 
Questions 15 and 16 evaluate whether there was any change or increase in the 
shareholder’s protection after the adoption of IFRS. Finally, questions 17 to 19 
investigate the insider trading laws and enforcement of these laws. Question 17 
addresses whether there were any insider trading activities in recent years. Question 18 
discusses whether the regulator prosecuted the people involved in these insider trading 
activities. It is worth noting that countries with higher investor protection have a history 
where the regulator prosecuted the people involved in such activities. Question 19 
investigates whether there were any convictions for those involved in insider trading 
activities.  
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3.1.1 Results of the questionnaire – Enforcement 
 
 In this section we comment the main results of the questionnaire due to space, 
but all results are summarized and presented in Appendix 2.  
With regard to questions 1 and 2, all five countries have had a securities market 
regulator monitoring the financial reporting of public companies, and this has not 
changed since the mandatory IFRS adoption. Regarding question 3, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission officers indicated that there are firms which did not comply with 
the IFRS requirements, which suggests a weak enforcement of accounting standards in 
these countries as also documented in Brown et al. (2014).  
Referring to question 4, all countries can issue fines and charges if a firm or 
manager does not comply with the accounting standards in force; however, only in 
Brazil the Securities and Exchange Commission has the power to suspend temporarily 
the manager from his role. This indicates that Brazil has a stronger enforcement in 
comparison to other countries. The legislations concerning question 5 are listed on 
appendix 2 and the replies from question 6 indicate that there has been no change in the 
penalties and consequences for firms’ and managers’ noncompliance behaviours since 
the adoption of IFRS. Regarding the number of firms caught by the regulator in the 
post-IFRS period only in Brazil there were a few companies caught by the regulator. 
With regard to question 8, no country reported an increase in staff members responsible 
for monitoring the implementation of IFRS concurrent with the adoption of IFRS.
 8
  
                                               
8 There was an increment in staff members responsible for assisting in the monitoring of the accounting 
standards in force after two and two and a half years of the adoption of IFRS in Brazil and in Peru, 
respectively. Brazil hired 3 extra staff members in January of 2012, but they have been relocated to other 
roles in due course; by 2015, the number of staff responsible for the enforcement of the standards 
increased by only 1 member, and in Peru, 1 extra staff member was hired in July 2014. Overall, as the 
increment was years after the adoption of the standards and considering that staff has also been 
responsible for other roles, this is not considered as a significant change. 
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Overall, the results indicate that the enforcement of these countries is weak; 
however, Brazil has a stronger enforcement in comparison with the other sampling 
countries, which is consistent with the findings of Brown et al. (2014). Additionally, 
according to the results of questions 2, 6 and 8, there were no concurrent changes in 
enforcement alongside the adoption of IFRS. 
 
3.1.2 Results of the questionnaire - Investor protection mechanisms 
 
 Regarding questions 9 and 10, all five countries adopt the system “one-share-
one-vote”; however, only in Peru and Chile the shareholder can vote through the mail. 
Thus, it is worth noting that Peru and Chile have higher investor protection mechanisms 
in comparison to the other Latin American countries with regard to question 10. 
Regarding question 11, only in Argentina the shareholder, in order to be eligible to vote, 
needs to deposit his shares in the company prior to a shareholder meeting. As a result, 
this represents a higher constraint in relation to other Latin American countries, which 
indicates that the investor protection mechanism in Argentina is lower than the other 
countries.  
Referring to question 12, all countries allow the minority shareholders to 
prosecute and challenge the directors’ decision in the court of justice. Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and Mexico, however, define that it is required at least 5% of share capital in 
order to challenge a director’s decision in court, whereas Peru does not require a 
minimum percentage of share capital. Thus, Peru has a higher investor protection in 
comparison to the other Latin American countries with regard to this question. With 
regard to question 13 (percentage of share capital needed to call for a shareholder 
meeting), Argentina requires 60% in the first call and 30% in the second call; Brazil and 
Chile require 10%, Mexico specifies 75%, unless defined otherwise in the firm’s statute, 
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whereas Peru requires 20%. As Mexico demands the highest percentage, it is the 
country with the lowest investor protection mechanism in respect to this issue. 
Regarding the mandatory dividend (question 14), Argentina does not specify a 
minimum, whereas Brazil, Chile and Mexico specify 25%, 30% and 5%, respectively. 
Moreover, Peru only defines 50% of mandatory dividends if 20% of the shareholders 
demand it. Thus, as Argentina and Peru do not specify a minimum percentage, they are 
likely to have stronger mechanisms to safeguard the investors’ capital.  
In relation to questions 15 and 16, it is worth noting that none of the countries 
have improved their investor protection mechanisms since the IFRS adoption. This 
allows this study to pinpoint with greater precision the impact of IFRS and firm-level 
incentives. 
With regard to question 17, only Brazil and Chile have informed the number of 
insider trading activities caught by the regulator
9
. In Brazil, the regulator caught the first 
case of insider trading in 2009, and the first conviction was only in November 2016. In 
Brazil and Chile, the replies of questions 18 and 19 illustrate that it is not the 
responsibility of the regulator to take further actions to court, but from the public 
ministry. Moreover, only in Brazil the regulator has prosecuted companies (please refer 
to Appendix 2 for the detailed number of firms per year), whereas the regulators from 
the other countries have not provided an answer to these questions.  
This illustrates that the investor protection mechanisms in Latin American 
countries are weak, and it is consistent with the investor ranking of La Porta et al. 
(1998) and the World Bank’s ranking. It is worth noting though, that Brazil, Chile and 
Peru have stronger investor protection mechanisms than Argentina and Mexico.  
                                               
9 Please refer to the footnote of appendix 2 for the detailed number of firms. 
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In conclusion, our findings show that the institutional settings of these countries 
are weak, which is consistent to previous research (La Porta et al. 1998, Brown et al., 
2014) and have not been substantially improved concurrent with the adoption of IFRS. 
This shows that the institutional environment will not affect our inferences from the 
effect of the IFRS adoption. As these countries have a slightly different institutional 
setting: Brazil has the strongest enforcement among these countries and Brazil, Chile 
and Peru have stronger investor protection mechanisms. In order to control for this, the 
country fixed effects are implemented in our econometric design presented in the 
following sections. 
 
3.2 Measures of analysts’ information environment 
To test H1, we adopt four metrics to evaluate whether the analysts’ information 
environment improved after the IFRS adoption. According to Lang and Lundholm 
(1996) and Panaretou et al. (2013), our first metric is the earnings’ unsigned forecast 
error, which is calculated as follows: 
     
                
 
                
   
                    
(1) 
where      
 
 denotes current-year (the superscript t) earnings’ forecast error for firm i in 
year t;                
   
 
 is the mean of current-year earnings per share for firm i in 
year t.             
 
 is the realised earnings per share collected from the Actual file of 
the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S).              -  is the share price in 
year t-1.
10
 We use the forecasts issued during the six months prior to the earnings 
                                               
10
 We also calculate the median of current-year and one-year-ahead earnings forecasts to estimate the 
forecast error, as it minimizes potential problems associated with mean calculations due to outliers 
(Preiato et al., 2015). We reach similar results and the same conclusion.  
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announcement date of each firm
11
. For further clarification on these calculations and the 
following calculations, please refer to Figure 1. We calculate the one-year-ahead 
earnings (the superscript t+1) forecast error for firm i in year t (     
   
) in the same 
fashion. 
The second metric is the dispersion of current-year earnings forecasts (         
 
) 
of firm i in year t. According to Byard et al. (2011) and Preiato et al. (2015), this is 
equal to the standard deviation of forecasted EPS scaled by the previous share price in 
model (2)
12
: 
         
 
                  
   
                      
(2) 
We also calculate the dispersion of one-year-ahead earnings forecasts (         
   
) 
of firm i in year t in the same fashion. The third metric is the logarithm of the number of 
analysts following a firm, according to model (3). 
            
 
              
   (3) 
where          
 
 denotes the number of analysts following firm i that issues current-
year forecast (the superscript t) in year t (the subscript t). We calculate this variable for 
analysts following firm i that issue one-year-ahead forecasts in the same fashion. 
The fourth metric is the dispersion of current-year target price forecasts of firm i in 
year t (           
 
) defined according to model (4). 
           
 
                 
   
                  
   
   (4) 
                                               
11 We try to use only one month or three months before the earnings announcement date, but the number 
of observations reduces significantly, so we adopt the 6 months period. 
12 We also derive similar results scaling for the absolute mean of the forecast as in Lang and Lundholm 
(1996) and Panaretou et al. (2013). Additionally, we set a requirement of a minimum of two analysts 
issuing forecasts for a firm, in order to calculate analysts’ forecasts dispersion. 
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where                  
   
  denotes the standard deviation of current-year target price 
of firm i in year t;               
   
 is the absolute mean of target price forecasts of 
firm i in year t. 
We calculate forecast errors and dispersion of forecasts according to forecast 
observations issued within the last six months before the earnings announcement date of 
firm i in year t. Other market and accounting variables are calculated according to the 
financial year of firm i. Figure 1 presents the calculations of variables. 
[Figure 1 here] 
3.3 Overall impact of IFRS  
To examine the overall impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on analysts’ 
information environment due to hypotheses H1a, H1b, H1c and H1d, we report seven 
regressions estimates according to models (5), (6) and (7) in the following:  
         
     
 
                                
 
  
 
                 
                        
 
             
 
   
   
      
1 
d 1
    
    
        
5
c 1
      
(5) 
At model (5),          
 
 is a common variable, which denotes current-year earnings 
forecast error (     
 
), one-year-head earnings forecast errors (     
   
), dispersion of 
current-year earnings forecast error (         
 
), or one-year-ahead earnings forecast 
error (         
   
).         is equal to 1 if the forecasts are derived after mandatory IFRS 
adoption and is equal to 0 otherwise. If the mandatory adoption of IFRS improves 
analysts’ information environment,  
 
 is expected to be negatively significant. The 
following variables are control variables.         is the change in reported earnings of 
firm i from year t-1 to t scaled by the share price in year t-1 (Liang and Riedl, 2014). It 
measures firms’ performance and thereby affects analysts’ forecast errors or forecast 
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dispersion (Liang and Riedl, 2014).     -  is the stock return of firm i in year t-1. It 
measures whether analysts incorporate all previous stock returns in their forecasts. 
        is the log of the market value of equity. This is because there are more analysts 
following large firms, which therefore provide more information.              
 
 is 
the log of 1 plus the average number of days between the earnings forecast and the 
earnings announcement date, for firm i in year t. It measures the time horizon, which 
can affect the accuracy of the forecast. Analysts’ forecast error and dispersion may 
increase when the forecast horizon increases. There are twelve North American 
Industry Classification System (      ) groups for our industrial firms. So, we set 
twelve industry dummies: Dummy 1: Sector 11, agriculture, forestry, fishing and 
hunting; Dummy 2: Sector 21, mining, quarrying, oil and gas extraction; Dummy 3: 
Sector 22, utilities; Dummy 4: Sector 23, construction; Dummy 5: Sector 31-33, 
manufacturing; Dummy 6: Sector 42, wholesale trade; Dummy 7: Sector 44-45, retail 
trade; Dummy 8: Sector 48-49, transportation and warehousing; Dummy 9: Sector 51, 
information; Dummy 10: Sector 54, professional scientific and technical services; 
Dummy 11: Sector 72, accommodation and food services; Dummy 12: Sector 81, other 
services (excluding public administration, repair and maintenance). These industry 
dummies control for the effect of different operating risks in different industries and the 
effect of different regulations.          is a dummy variable for each country. It 
captures the effect of the institutional setting of each country
13
. The results are similar if 
we include the enforcement proxy of Brown et al. (2014). 
            
 
     
 
                             
1 
d 1
 (6) 
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5
c 1
      
Model (6) assesses the impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on the log of the 
number of analysts issuing current-year earnings forecasts for the firms in our sample 
(            
 
) due to hypothesis H1c. We also assess the impact considering the 
analysts that issue one-year-ahead earnings forecasts (            
   
). The variables 
are defined in the above models.    
           
 
    
 
                                  
 
  
 
       
                           
 
                         
 
   
   
      
1 
   
 
                          
    
        
5
c 1
      
(7) 
Model (7) investigates the impact of IFRS on the dispersion of current-year target 
price forecasts (           
 
) due to hypothesis H1d.               
 
 denotes the 
log of the number of analysts issuing current-year target price forecasts. 
               
 
 is the log of 1 plus the mean of the number of days between each 
analyst’s target price forecast, and the earnings announcement date for firm i in year t.  
3.4  Firm-level reporting incentives  
Our second objective is to investigate whether firms with stronger incentives to 
adopt IFRS would perceive a higher enhancement in analysts’ information environment, 
which matches our second hypothesis H2. Earlier research (e.g. Barth et al., 2008; 
Byard et al., 2011, Christensen et al., 2013) indicates that: (i) highly profitable firms, 
(ii) firms that have higher growth opportunities, (iii) highly leveraged firms, (iv) greatly 
internationalized firms, and (v) firms audited by high-quality auditors, have stronger 
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incentives to produce high-quality financial reports. As such, we follow the model of 
Byard et al. (2011) by introducing the above five factors into the models (8), (9) and 
(10). They are as follows. 
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5
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(10) 
where        equals one if one of the Big 4 auditors audits firm i in year t, otherwise it 
equals 0.         is the book to market value ratio. It is a proxy for growth 
opportunities.        is equal to total liabilities divided by total assets.          is the 
number of foreign stock markets that a firm i lists on. It denotes the firm’s 
internationality.        is the ratio of net income over total assets.  
We expect that the coefficients on        ,       ,        and          in the 
above models will be significantly negative, whereas the coefficient of         will be 
significantly positive if a firm has stronger reporting incentives and can improve the 
analysts’ information environment. 
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Next, we investigate whether the adoption of IFRS can improve analysts’ 
information environment in Latin American countries with weak institutional settings 
after controlling for the effect of firm-level reporting incentives. Therefore, we 
introduce the IFRS dummy in the following models (11), (12) and (13):  
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d 1
   
    
        
5
c 1
  i,t 
(13) 
We expect that the coefficient on         will remain consistent with those 
coefficients in models (5), (6) and (7). 
3.5  Analysis of the precision of public, private and consensus 
information  
The above models demonstrate the impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on 
analysts’ information environment. In this section we examine whether mandatory 
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adoption of IFRS affects the precision of public, private, and consensus information. 
Models to investigate the precision of information started with Barry and Jennings 
(1992) and Abarbanell et al. (1995). Afterwards, Barron et al. (1998) extended their 
measure in order to model the type and the precision of information that analysts use to 
issue their forecasts. Barron et al. (1998) argue that those analysts’ forecast errors are 
composed of a common error and an idiosyncratic error. The common error reflects the 
error in the public information which analysts rely upon, whereas the idiosyncratic error 
reflects the error in the private information that analysts rely upon
14
. As such, we 
examine the precision of information after mandatory IFRS adoption by adopting the 
approach of Barron et al. (1998) and Byard et al. (2011), which is detailed as follows: 
          
               
                      
 
 
 (14) 
           
    
                      
 
 
 (15) 
             
         
                    
 
 (16) 
where      is the variance of analysts’ forecasts for firm i in year t.       is the squared 
error in the mean forecast, and      is the number of forecasts for firm i in year t (Byard 
et al., 2011). Different from the approach of Barron et al. (1998) and Byard et al. 
(2011), we standardize
15
 the variables of          ,           , and              
after the calculations of models (14), (15) and (16). This is because the denominator in 
models (14) and (15) is very small in comparison to the numerator, and produces very 
                                               
14 Note that the measure for           reflects the error arising from both common and private 
information, whereas the measure for             reflects the forecast dispersion, which only reflects the 
idiosyncratic error arising from private information (Barron et al., 1998). 
15 The standardization consists of subtracting for each variable the mean of the variable and scaling by its 
standard deviation. 
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large numbers and affects the scale of the variables in the following model (17).
16
 After 
this standardization, we estimate the association between        , and          , 
           and              via model (17).              is a common variable, 
which denotes          ,            and             . 
 
                                              
1 
d 1
 
        
    
        
5
c 1
      
 
(17) 
To maintain consistency,         is also standardized in the same fashion.
17
 We 
predict that the coefficient of         associated with           or              is 
positive, which indicates an improvement in the precision of public information or 
consensus information brought about by the mandatory adoption of IFRS.  Analysts 
may still rely on private information, but we do not expect that IFRS will increase the 
precision of private information; therefore, we expect the association between         
and            to be insignificant. Appendix 1 presents the definition of the variables. 
 
4.  Sample and data 
In this section we illustrate the sample selection criteria, as well as the data sources 
and the descriptive statistics of our data. Finally, we present univariate analysis 
                                               
16
 This study finds similar results by following the method of Byard et al. (2011), and by bootstrapping 
the sample 1000 times. 
17 As in Byard et al. (2011),         is used as the only control variable because it is the variable that has 
higher influence over the quantity and quality of the information available. Another variable such as the 
number of analysts following could also affect the precision of information; the inferences are similar if 
            
 
 is included.   
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regarding the effect of firm-level reporting incentives on analysts’ information 
environment. 
4.1 Sampling criteria 
We consider only industrial firms listed on Latin American stock exchanges. We 
exclude banks and financial institutions as their accounting standards are different to 
those of industrial firms as well as we exclude early adopters by manually checking the 
IFRS adoption date of each firm. We choose the sample period from 1
st
 January 2003 to 
31
st
 December 2015 after referring to the official dates of IFRS adoption in Latin 
American countries reported on the IFRS website.
18
 In this study, we focus on four 
years before and four years after the official dates of the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 
each country.   
Given the above criteria for data collection our sample comprises of firms from 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru, as firms from other Latin American 
countries adopted IFRS after 2014, or their data in the sample period is not available.  
4.2  Data Source 
Analysts’ forecast data is collected from the Detail File of I/B/E/S. The actual 
earnings per share are collected from the Actual File of I/B/E/S. The market and 
accounting data are from the DataStream database. Although I/B/E/S has analysts’ EPS 
forecasts since 1980, its coverage for Latin American countries is limited because 
analysts tend to follow only large firms with higher trading volumes (Hayes, 1998). The 
number of analysts following firms in Latin America is therefore lower in comparison 
with developed nations. After the introduction of IFRS, the average number of analysts 
following firms doubled for the five countries of our sample.  
                                               
18 http://www.ifrs.org/Use-around-the-world/Documents/Jurisdiction-profiles/ 
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4.3  Sample Description 
We find 618 firms from the Detail File of I/B/E/S. However, excluding the 
financial sector as well as early adopters leaves us with 534 companies. Panel A of 
Table 1 reports the sample structure of these five countries. There are 97 firms for 
which all required data is available in at least one of the eight years around the official 
date of IFRS adoption. Panel B shows that there is 1 firm in Argentina, 76 firms in 
Brazil, 17 firms in Chile, 3 firms in Mexico, and no firms from Peru. The total number 
of firms in our sample is therefore 97.
19
 Considering the small sample size, we also 
conduct another set of empirical analysis referring to the Summary File of I/B/E/S, 
which contains  85 firms with data available regarding the earnings’ forecasts 
(accuracy, dispersion and number of analysts following) as illustrated in Panel C. Of the 
285 firms, 278 have target price forecasts. These analyses are not reported, but are 
available upon request. We reach very similar results and the same conclusion as those 
reported in the following sections
20
.  
[Table 1 here] 
4.4  Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows that the current-year earnings forecast error (     
 
) decreased 
following the IFRS adoption, and that the difference between the pre- and post-adoption 
period is significant at 5%. In contrast, the one-year-ahead earnings forecast error 
(     
   
) and the dispersion of current-year earnings forecasts (         
 
) are lower 
following mandatory IFRS adoption; however, the difference is not statistically 
                                               
19 This is the number of firms with available data for all control variables regarding earnings forecasts. 
The number of firms for the other analyses is different due to data availability. For the detailed number of 
firms with data available for each analysis, please refer to the information available at the bottom of each 
table. 
20 The models adopted in this set of analyses differ slightly from the ones reported in the paper. As this is 
the summary file, we do not have the forecast horizon (             
 
;              
   
; 
               
   as a control variable, because this information is not available in I/B/E/S. 
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significant. Furthermore, the dispersion of one-year-ahead earnings forecasts 
(         
   
) and the dispersion of current-year target price forecasts (           
   
decreased in the post-adoption period and the difference between the two periods is 
statistically significant at 5%.             
 
 and             
   
 are higher 
following mandatory IFRS adoption and these results are statistically significant at 1%. 
This suggests that the number of analysts following the firms increased in the post-
adoption period.           and              increased, and this increase is 
statistically significant at 10% and 1% respectively. These results suggest that the 
precision of public and consensus information increased following IFRS adoption. 
However, as there is no significant difference in            across the two periods, this 
suggests that the precision of private information did not increase following IFRS 
adoption, which is in line with our prediction. Overall, the results suggest that analysts’ 
information environment improved following mandatory IFRS adoption.  
Regarding the incentive variables, only the difference in the book-to-market value 
(       ) is statistically significant at 5%. For the control variables, the differences in 
             
 
,              
   
 and                
 
 are statistically 
insignificant over the 8-year time span. This suggests that the analysts’ pattern of 
issuing forecasts did not change. The differences in             
 
, 
            
    and               
 
 between the pre- and post-IFRS adoption 
period are statistically significant at 1%. This indicates that the number of analysts 
following Latin American firms is higher in the post-adoption period. We find the same 
significant changes in the logarithm of market value (       ) and in        .   
 [Table 2 here] 
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4.5  Univariate analysis for firm-level reporting incentives 
To examine whether firm-level reporting incentives affect the analysts’ information 
environment, we compare analysts’ earnings forecast errors and the dispersion of 
earnings forecasts between firms with strong reporting incentives and firms with weak 
reporting incentives: (a) in the 8 years around the IFRS adoption date and (b) in the 4 
years after the IFRS adoption date. We then focus on (c) firms with strong reporting 
incentives in the 8 years around the IFRS adoption date specifically. We classify the 
firms as having strong or weak reporting incentives based on the following variables: (i) 
firms audited by Big 4 audit firms versus other audit firms,       ; (ii) firms with more 
international listings versus no international listings,        ; (iii) firms which are 
more profitable versus those which are less profitable,       ; (iv) firms with a greater 
debt ratio versus a lower debt ratio,       ; and (v) firms with more growth 
opportunities versus fewer growth opportunities,        . We classify a firm as having 
strong reporting incentives if it is audited by a Big 4 auditing firm (      ) or lists on 
foreign stock exchanges (        ). It is classified as having weak reporting incentives 
if it is audited by other auditing firms, or only lists on domestic stock exchanges. 
Similarly, we classify a firm as having strong reporting incentives if its       , or        
are above the average values of these variables in the same industry, otherwise it is 
classified as having weak reporting incentives. For        , a firm is classified as 
having strong reporting incentives if it has a lower than average value of this variable in 
the same industry, otherwise it is classified as having weak reporting incentives.  
Panel A of Table 3 reports that the differences in the mean of current-year forecast 
errors (     
 
) between firms with strong and weak incentives in the 8 years around the 
IFRS adoption are statistically significant at 1% and 10% respectively. Nevertheless, the 
mean of current-year forecast errors for highly leveraged firms and firms with more 
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growth opportunities is bigger, and the difference is significant at 1%. This implies that 
analysts find it challenging to issue forecasts for these firms. This may be because 
highly leveraged firms may defer the recognition of bad news in case it does not help to 
improve the firms’ financial position, whereas there are higher expectations (bigger 
room) for firms with more growth opportunities, which can affect the forecasting ability 
of analysts.  
Panel B of Table 3 reports that the differences in the mean of current-year forecast 
errors (     
 
) between firms with strong and weak incentives in the 4 years after the 
IFRS adoption date are statistically significant at 1%, except for firms classified by 
         which is not statistically significant. This suggests that the current-year 
earnings forecast errors for firms with strong incentives are significantly lower than 
those for firms with weak incentives in the 4 years after the IFRS adoption. The results 
for firms classified by        and         are similar to those in Panel A. 
Panel C of Table 3 reports that firms with strong reporting incentives have current-
year forecast errors which are significantly lower in the post-IFRS adoption compared 
to pre-IFRS adoption at 1%, except those firms classified by       . This suggests that 
for firms with strong incentives, there is a further enhancement in analysts’ information 
environment in the post-adoption period. Therefore, firms’ reporting incentives affect 
analysts’ information environment beyond the impact of IFRS.    
[Table 3 here] 
Table 4 reports the changes in the dispersion of current-year earnings forecasts 
(         
 
) for firms with strong and weak reporting incentives in the same fashion as 
Table 3. The results are consistent with those in Table 3.  
We undertake the same analysis for one-year-ahead earnings forecast errors, 
dispersion of one-year-ahead earnings forecast errors, and dispersion of current-year 
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target price. The results are highly consistent with those in Tables 3 and 4. We do not 
report these results, but they are available upon request. They confirm that firms’ 
reporting incentives play a role in shaping the analysts’ information environment. The 
above is based on univariate analysis, and will be confirmed using multivariate analysis 
in the next section.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
5.   Results 
This section firstly explores the overall impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on 
analysts’ information environment. Afterwards, we investigate whether firm-level 
reporting incentives can influence the information environment, and whether IFRS can 
affect analysts’ information environment after controlling for firm-level reporting 
incentives. Lastly, we report the results regarding whether the precision of public, 
private and consensus information improved after the IFRS adoption. 
5.1 Overall impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS  
Table 5 reports the results of estimating models (5), (6) and (7), which regress the 
analysts’ information environment (measured by      
 
,      
   
,          
 
,         
   
, 
           
 
,             
 
 and             
   
) on         and the control 
variables. These results demonstrate whether the mandatory adoption of IFRS improves 
the analysts’ information environment in Latin American countries, where the 
institutional settings of enforcement and investor protection are weak. 
The results show that the coefficients of         are significantly negative for the 
regressions on      
 
 and         
 
, as well as for the regression on            
 
 at 5% 
and 10%, respectively. These results indicate that analysts’ forecast errors, as well as 
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analysts’ forecast dispersion, decrease after mandatory IFRS adoption. In contrast, for 
the regressions on      
   
 and         
   
, the coefficients of         are insignificantly 
positive. This indicates that there is no significant change in analysts’ one-year-ahead 
earnings forecast errors, and in analysts’ one-year-ahead forecast dispersion, in the post-
adoption period. This may be because analysts already digest the effect of IFRS 
adoption on firms’ reporting quality in the year of adoption, and expect that the 
improved accounting information quality will be maintained in the future. In other 
words, they already reflect this in one-year-ahead earnings forecasts. 
In the regressions of             
 
 and             
   
, the estimated 
coefficients on         are significantly positive at 1%. This suggests that, after Latin 
American firms adopt IFRS, the number of analysts following firms increases 
significantly. This may be due to the increased disclosure of financial information 
required by IFRS. In summary, the above results indicate that analysts’ information 
environment improves in the post-adoption period.  
The coefficients on         are statistically significant in the regressions of      
 
, 
         
 
 and          
   
 at 10% respectively. This suggests that the current-year 
earnings forecast error of the analysts following larger firms is slightly higher than for 
analysts following smaller firms, whereas their dispersion is lower. Moreover, the 
coefficients on         in the regressions of             
 
 and             
   
 are 
significantly positive at 1%, which illustrates that larger firms have more analysts 
following them. The estimated coefficients on     -  are significantly positive at 5% and 
1% in the regressions on          
   
 and            
 
. This suggests that analysts use 
the stock returns to derive their forecasts. However, it also illustrates that the more 
analysts rely on stock returns, the more their disagreement increases. The estimated 
coefficient on             
 
 is only significant in the regression on          
 
. This 
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coefficient is significantly positive, which is contrary to our predictions. However, it is 
worth noting that more analysts following firms creates room for increased 
disagreement among them (Houqe et al., 2014), and this could explain these results. 
Lastly, the estimated coefficient of                
 
 is significantly positive at 10%, 
which indicates that the dispersion of target price forecasts is higher when the forecast 
horizon is longer. The above results are consistent with hypotheses H1a, H1b, H1c, and 
H1d.  
[Table 5 here] 
5.2 The impact of firm-level reporting incentives on analysts’ 
information environment 
In this section we investigate how firm-level reporting incentives affect analysts’ 
information environment, based on models (8), (9) and (10), by regressing the analysts’ 
information environment (measured by      
 
,      
   
,          
 
,         
   
, 
           
 
,             
 
 and             
   
) on variables that denote firm-
level reporting incentives (      ,        ,       ,         ,       ) and the control 
variables. 
Table 6 shows that        is significantly associated with             
   
 at 1%, 
and that         is significantly associated with          
 
,             
 
 and 
            
   
 at 10%, 1% and 5% respectively. These findings suggest that the 
dispersion of current-year earnings forecasts decreases for firms with greater growth 
opportunities, whereas there are more analysts following firms with lower growth 
opportunities. The coefficient of        is significantly negative in the regression of 
           
 
 at 1%, which indicates that the dispersion of current-year target price 
forecasts is higher for highly leveraged firms.          has a significantly negative 
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coefficient at 10% in the regression on          
 
, which indicates that the analysts’ 
forecast dispersion is lower for firms listed on foreign exchanges. Lastly, the coefficient 
of        is significantly negative at 1% for the regression of            
 
, which 
indicates that the dispersion of target price forecasts is lower for firms with greater 
profitability. Overall, these results indicate that firms’ reporting incentives do affect 
analysts’ information environment. This is consistent with hypothesis H2 and confirms 
the results from the univariate analysis reported in Section 4.5. 
[Table 6 here] 
5.3 Impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on analysts’ information 
environment after controlling for firm-level reporting incentives 
 
Given the results in Tables 5 and 6, we now examine whether IFRS improves 
analysts’ information environment after controlling for firm-level reporting incentives 
based on models (11), (12) and (13). We regress the analysts’ information environment 
(measured by      
 
,      
   
,          
 
,         
   
,            
 
,             
 
 and 
            
   
) on        , firm-level reporting incentives (      ,        ,       , 
        ,       ) as well as the other control variables. 
Table 7 shows that         is negatively associated in the regressions of  
     
 
 and          
 
, as well as in the regression of            
 
, at 5% and 1% 
respectively. Moreover,         is positively associated with             
 
 and 
            
   
 at 1%. However, the association between         and      
   
 as well as 
        and          
   
 is positive but insignificant. These results are consistent with 
those reported in Table 5, implying that mandatory adoption of IFRS can improve 
analysts’ information environment after controlling firms’ incentives, particularly when 
the institutional settings of Latin American countries, such as the enforcement of 
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accounting standards and the investor protection mechanisms, are weak and did not 
change significantly in the 4 years following the IFRS adoption. 
[Table 7 here] 
5.4 The precision of the information environment 
Table 7, along with the previous sections, shows that IFRS can improve analysts’ 
information environment in Latin American countries after controlling for firm-level 
reporting incentives, and under the weak institutional setting, without significant 
changes to enforcement and investor protection. In this section we further investigate 
how mandatory adoption of IFRS affects analysts’ public, private and consensus 
information based on the works of Barron et al. (1998) and Byard et al. (2011). Based 
on model (17), Table 8 presents the association between         and          , 
           and             , respectively.  
The results show that         is positively associated with           at 5% 
significance. This suggests that the precision of public information is higher following 
the IFRS adoption. This is consistent with the hypothesis H3a. However, the association 
between         and            is insignificantly negative. This suggests that the 
adoption of IFRS increases the precision of public information, but it does not affect 
analysts’ information gathered from private sources.         is positively associated with 
             at 1%. This suggests that the precision of consensus information is also 
increased, which is consistent with the findings of increased precision of public 
information.  
In summary, our results show that IFRS improves the precision of public and 
consensus information. Together with the results in Tables 5 and 7, we conclude that the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS improves the analysts’ information environment in Latin 
American countries, after controlling for firm-level reporting incentives. This 
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improvement is mainly reflected in the precision of public information and consensus 
information. 
[Table 8 here] 
5.5 Additional robustness tests 
We have conducted a battery of robustness tests. First, we also estimated all 
regressions using firm-fixed effects to control for firm specific characteristics within a 
country and our inferences remained unchanged. Second, we gathered another sample 
of firms from the IBES summary file as pointed out on Section 4.3 with 285 firms 
presented on table 1, panel C and also find similar results. Third, as the findings of this 
study could be attributed to analysts improving their forecast accuracy over time and not 
due to the adoption of IFRS, we generate another set of results (not reported) by 
estimating all regressions with a trend variable included. This variable is set as a 
continuous increasing trend over the years. For instance, it is 1 if the year is 2006, 2 if 
the year is 2007, 3 if the year is 2008, etc. This variable identifies whether the metrics 
employed in this study are affected by a trend overtime. It suggests that such a trend is 
not a problem and the results remain consistent to those presented above, as this 
variable is insignificant. Fourth, we have also extensively tried to use a difference-in-
difference design, however there is a major problem with this approach in our case. All 
firms are mandated to adopt IFRS in our sample and as such we do not have any non-
adopter to compare with considering the countries in our sample. We have tried to get 
data for firms in other countries that share the institutional settings with Latin American 
countries that had not adopted IFRS prior to 2015 and have data available to conduct the 
analyses. To some extent we have tried to use data of firms from Colombia that have 
only adopted IFRS in 2014 and Bolivia that have not adopted IFRS. However, there are 
no firms with data available using the IBES detail file. Moreover, we have also tried to 
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use the IBES summary file, however there are only 2 Colombian firms with data 
available with many missing control variables as well as missing long-term mean 
provided by the analysts. Therefore, we could not adopt this research design.  
6. Conclusion 
This study investigates (i) whether mandatory adoption of IFRS improves the 
analysts’ information environment in Latin American countries; (ii) whether firm-level 
reporting incentives affect the analysts’ information environment; and (iii) whether the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS improves the precision of public and consensus 
information. We expand the measures of analysts’ information environment currently 
used by the literature such as the number of analysts following firms, analysts’ forecast 
errors, and dispersion of current-year earnings forecasts; we include these metrics 
regarding one-year-ahead earnings forecasts as well as the dispersion of current-year 
target price forecasts. We also extend the measurement period to four years prior and 
four years after the mandatory adoption of IFRS. This allows us to examine the long-
term effect of IFRS adoption. The results show that the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
improves analysts’ information environment in Latin American countries. This may be 
because of the difference between the domestic accounting standards and IFRS, and the 
increase in disclosure required by IFRS. This result holds after controlling for firm-level 
reporting incentives. Second, firm-level reporting incentives can improve analysts’ 
information environment. This may be because firms intend to signal the quality of their 
equity to investors by adopting IFRS when investors perceive a high cost to verify 
financial information, and risk in investing in emerging markets. Third, the 
improvement in analysts’ information environment, brought out by the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS, is reflected in the enhanced precision of public and consensus 
information. As the precision of public and consensus information is improved, this 
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strengthens the above explanation that the adoption of IFRS enhances the quality of 
information available to analysts, in comparison to the quality of information provided 
by the previous domestic standards, which were mainly designed for tax and 
government needs, and were of little use for the external users. 
  Our research extends the literature regarding the impact of IFRS on analysts’ 
information environment. Christensen et al. (2013) and Preiato et al. (2015) indicate 
that a country’s institutional settings, and its development over the years, are mixed 
with the impact of the IFRS adoption. As such, previous literature that has not 
considered these features would need to be revisited. By investigating Latin American 
countries where the institutional settings have not changed significantly, we mitigate the 
issue raised by previous literature and bring more accurate evidence of the sole effect of 
the IFRS adoption. Our study indicates that the adoption of IFRS can benefit analysts 
covering Latin American firms, mainly due to the big gap between IFRS and previous 
domestic accounting standards that affects the quality and usefulness of financial 
statements in the long-term. It is worth noting, however, that the benefits from the 
adoption of IFRS could take more time to appear depending on countries’ institutional 
settings, firms’ incentives, and the difference between IFRS and previous domestic 
accounting standards. Thus, we suggest that future studies consider a long-term 
approach in comparison with a short-term approach (2 years before and after the IFRS 
adoption, for instance) in their research design. Investigating a short-term approach may 
lead to inconclusive evidence about the impact of IFRS, and as such future research can 
cast more light on the impact of IFRS adoption on analysts’ information environment in 
other countries by investigating the longer-term.  
Our study is a reference point for the IASB and the regulators of Latin American 
countries. The results confirm the positive impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS as 
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well as the governments’ policies regarding the implementation of these standards. As 
analysts’ information environment improves, this could be beneficial for investors who 
could now more accurately assess their risks in investing in these emerging economies. 
It could be beneficial for forming portfolios and achieving higher yields as they 
compare the performance of these firms with other international firms. Following the 
economic and political crises that these countries have faced in recent years, lower 
inflation rates and higher growth rates alongside the increase in the reliability of 
financial statements of public companies may attract more investment, which could lead 
to an improvement in market efficiency as well as market liquidity (Han et al., 2016).  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of the calculations of forecast error and forecast dispersion  
 
 
 
The observations of current-year and one-year-ahead earnings forecast errors, and 
current-year target price, are collected within the first six months prior to the earnings 
announcement date of firm i in year t. Then, we calculate the mean and median of 
forecast errors of current-year earnings and one-year-ahead earnings due to model (1), 
dispersion of current-year earnings, one-year-ahead earnings and current-year target 
price due to model (2), and number of analysts issued forecasts due to model (3) based 
on these observations with the first six months prior to the earnings announcement date 
of firm i in year t. Market and accounting variables are calculated according to the 
financial year end of firm i in year t. 
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Table 1. Sample structure 2003-2015 
Panel A. Number of firms from I/B/E/S 
   NAICS Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Peru Total 
11 3 1 3 2 
 
9 
21 7 17 8 9 16 57 
22 12 30 20 7 5 74 
23 8 13 16 25 6 68 
31–33 16 41 29 38 22 146 
42 
      
44–45 1 18 9 17 1 46 
48–49 3 11 8 4 
 
26 
51 1 2 2 7 1 13 
54 1 3 1 2 
 
7 
72 
 
4 6 10 2 22 
81 3 34 6 19 4 66 
Total 55 174 108 140 57 534 
Panel B. Number of firms for which all data is available at least for one of the years during the period of 
eight years around the date of mandatory adoption of IFRS regarding current-year earnings forecasts. 
NAICS Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Peru Total 
11 
 
1 1 
  
2 
21 
 
5 2 
  
7 
22 
 
5 6 
  
11 
23 
 
6 0 
  
6 
31–33 
 
17 3 1 
 
21 
42 
      
44–45 
 
8 2 1 
 
11 
48–49 
 
7 1 1 
 
9 
51 1 1 
   
2 
54 
 
1 
   
1 
72 
  
1 
  
1 
81   25 1 
  
26 
Total 1 76 17 3 0 97 
Panel C. Number of firms for which all data is available during the period of eight years around the date 
of mandatory adoption of IFRS regarding current-year earnings forecasts. Data is collected from the 
Summary File of I/B/E/S. 
NAICS Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Peru Total 
11 
 
1 1  
 
2 
21 5 13 3 6 10 37 
22 7 16 11 4 4 42 
23 
 
9 4 13 4 30 
31–33 2 24 7 19 7 59 
42 1 4 4 6 
 
15 
44–45 
 
13 5 8 1 27 
48–49 
 
9 2 3 
 
14 
51 1 1  4 
 
6 
54 
 
3 1 1 
 
5 
72 
 
2 1 5 
 
8 
81  1 29 3 7 
 
40 
Total 17 124 42 76 26 285 
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Note: Panel A reports the number of Latin American firms downloaded from I/B/E/S for the sample 
period from 2003 to 2015. North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 11: agriculture, 
forestry, fishing and hunting; NAICS 21: mining, quarrying, oil and gas extraction; NAICS 22: utilities; 
NAICS 23: construction; NAICS 31–33: manufacturing; NAICS 42: wholesale trade; NAICS 44–45: 
retail trade; NAICS 48–49: transportation & warehousing; NAICS 51: information; NAICS 54: 
Professional scientific & technical services; NAICS 72: accommodation & food services; NAICS 81: 
other services (excluding public administration, religious organizations, grantmaking & giving services, 
voluntary organizations, social advisory services, human rights organizations, civil and social 
organizations, business & professional, political & labour organizations, business associations, 
professional organizations, private households etc.). Please note that in Panel B there are only 97 firms for 
which all data (inclusive of the control variables) is available to conduct the analyses for current-year 
earnings forecast errors. Tables 2 to 8 illustrate accurately the number of firms for the other analyses 
employed. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
 Pre Post 
 Obs Mean Median Std. Dev Obs Mean Median Std. Dev 
Test variables         
     
  257 0.0415 0.0116 0.173 369 0.0312** 0.00842 0.163 
     
    267 0.103 0.0225 0.348 354 0.105 0.0187 0.517 
            
 
 264 1.394 1.386 1.006 371 1.871*** 2.079*** 1.001 
            
   
 272 1.412 1.386 1.005 354 1.993*** 2.197*** 0.964 
         
 
 202 0.0216 0.0107 0.0290 325 0.0199 0.0103 0.0280 
         
   
 223 0.0283 0.0168 0.0374 329 0.0263** 0.0125** 0.0446 
           
 
 238 0.0850 0.0306 0.152 348 0.0702** 0.0444** 0.0993 
          168 -0.125 0.259 1.018 308 0.0682* 0.356* 0.819 
           168 0.0784 -0.298 0.973 308 -0.0428 -0.379 0.853 
             168 -0.246 -0.153 1.063 308 0.134*** 0.325*** 0.762 
         
Incentives variables         
       264 0.898 1 0.304 371 0.906 1 0.293 
        234 0.647 0.495 0.547 366 0.683 0.571** 0.602 
       259 1.431 0.970 2.301 369 1.641 1.230 1.830 
         264 0.345 0 0.707 371 0.240 0 0.605 
       259 0.0480 0.0497 0.0714 369 0.0404 0.0457 0.0872 
         
Control variables         
        237 7.330 7.245 1.263 368 7.535** 7.527** 1.189 
        219 -0.00746 -0.00936 0.0590 360 0.00833*** 0*** 0.0576 
       144 0.0891 -0.00335 0.486 268 0.0295 -0.0708* 0.446 
             
 
 260 4.501 4.727 0.793 365 4.501 4.700 0.705 
             
   
 289 6.243 6.256 0.232 365 6.238 6.240 0.257 
               
 
 233 4.014 3.912 0.442 330 4.010 3.970 0.337 
            
 
 264 1.394 1.386 1.006 371 1.871*** 2.079*** 1.001 
            
   
 272 1.412 1.386 1.005 354 1.993*** 2.197*** 0.964 
              
 
 261 2.511 2.708 1.299 357 3.237*** 3.526*** 1.259 
*, **, *** indicate the statistical significant difference between means (medians) in ‘Pre’ and in ‘Post’ at 
the 10%, 5%, 1% (respectively) two-tailed test.      
  is the absolute value of the mean of the forecast of 
earnings per share minus actual earnings per share divided by stock price at t-1 for current-year forecasts. 
     
    is the absolute value of the mean of the forecast of earnings per share minus actual earnings per 
share divided by stock price at t-1 for one-year ahead forecasts.             
 
 denotes the number of 
analysts following firm i that issues current-year forecasts (the superscript t) in year t (the subscript 
t).             
   
 denotes the number of analysts following firm i that issues one-year-ahead forecasts 
(the superscript t+1) in year t (the subscript t).          
 
 is the standard deviation of forecasts of earnings 
per share divided by stock price at t-1.         
   
 is the standard deviation of forecasts of one-year-ahead 
earnings per share divided by stock price at t-1.            
 
 The standard deviation of forecasts of target 
price per share divided by the absolute mean of current-year target price forecasts.           denotes the 
standardized values according to equation 14.            denotes the standardized values according to 
equation 15.              is the ratio that equals to           divided by           plus           . 
       equals one if one of the Big 4 auditors audits firm i in year t, otherwise is 0.         is the book to 
market value ratio.        is equal to total liabilities divided by total assets.          is the number of 
foreign stock markets that a firm i lists on.        is the ratio of net income over total assets.         is the 
log of the market value of equity.         is the change in reported earnings of firm i from year t-1 to t 
scaled by the share price in year t-1 (Liang and Riedl, 2014).     -  is the stock return of firm i in year t-1. 
             
 
 is the log of 1 plus the average number of days between the earnings forecast and the 
earnings announcement date, for firm i in year t.              
   
 is the log of 1 plus the average 
number of days between the earnings forecast and the earnings announcement date of year t+1.  
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 is the log of 1 plus the average number of days between each analysts’ forecast of 
target price, and target price of year t.               
  denotes the number of analysts following 
firm i that issues current-year target price forecasts (the superscript t) in year t (the subscript t). 
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Table 3. Changes in current-year earnings forecast errors (     
 
) for firms with strong and weak 
reporting incentives  
Panel A.      
  of firms with strong and weak reporting incentives in 8 years around the IFRS adoption 
date  
Period/Incentives Statistics                                       
Weak  incentives 
obs 56 517 288 437 246 
Mean  0.0780 0.0372 0.0590 0.0245 0.0342 
Strong incentives 
obs 570 109 338 189 380 
Mean  0.0312 0.0268 0.0152 0.0606 0.0361 
Strong incentives–
weak incentives 
Dif. -0.0468*** -0.0104* -0.0438*** 0.0361*** 0.0019*** 
Z-Wilcoxon -5.426 -1.731 -5.833 5.378 7.223 
Panel B.      
 
 of firms with strong and weak reporting incentives in 4 years after the IFRS adoption date 
Weak  incentives 
obs 33 313 178 244 147 
Mean  0.0497 0.0314 0.0529 0.0242 0.0301 
Strong incentives 
obs 336 56 191 125 222 
Mean  0.0293 0.0292 0.0108 0.0446 0.0317 
Strong incentives–
weak incentives 
Dif. -0.0204*** -0.0022 -0.0421*** 0.0204*** 0.0016*** 
Z-Wilcoxon -5.052 -1.613 -5.232 3.766 6.62 
Panel C.      
  of firms with strong reporting incentives in 8 years around the IFRS adoption date 
Pre-adoption period 
obs 234 53 147 64 158 
Mean  0.0338 0.0242 0.0209 0.0918 0.0423 
Post-adoption period 
obs 336 56 191 125 222 
Mean  0.0293 0.0292 0.0108 0.0446 0.0318 
Post-Pre 
Dif. -0.0045*** 0.0050 -0.0101*** -0.0472** -0.0105*** 
Z-Wilcoxon -3.169 0.485 -3.157 -2.526 -3.535 
*, ** and *** indicate the statistical significance between means at the 10%, 5% and 1% (respectively) 
two-tailed test. In this table, we evaluate whether the forecast error for firms with strong reporting 
incentives is lower after the IFRS adoption in comparison to firms with weak reporting incentives.        
equals one if one of the Big 4 auditors audits firm i in year t, otherwise is 0.         is the number of 
foreign stock markets that a firm i lists on.        is the ratio of net income over total assets.        is 
equal to total liabilities divided by total assets.         is the book to market value ratio.  
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Table 4. Changes in the dispersion of current-year earnings forecasts (         
 
) for firms with 
strong and weak reporting incentives  
Panel A.          
 
 of firms with strong and weak reporting incentives in 8 years around the IFRS 
adoption date 
Period/Incentives Statistics                                       
Weak  incentives 
obs 40 437 234 371 199 
Mean  0.0407 0.0195 0.0268 0.0173 0.0299 
Strong incentives 
obs 487 90 293 156 328 
Mean  0.0188 0.0255 0.0154 0.0281 0.0148 
Strong incentives–
weak incentives 
Dif. -0.0219*** 0.0060** -0.0114*** 0.0108*** -0.0151*** 
Z-Wilcoxon -4.035 2.038 -4.634 3.615 -7.046 
Panel B.          
 
 of firms with strong and weak reporting incentives in 4 years after the IFRS adoption 
date 
Weak  incentives 
Obs 25 274 154 216 123 
Mean  0.0403 0.0188 0.0271 0.0269 0.0299 
Strong incentives 
Obs 310 51 171 109 202 
Mean  0.0181 0.0252 0.0133 0.0162 0.0137 
Strong incentives–
weak incentives 
Dif. -0.0222*** 0.0064 -0.0138*** -0.0107** -0.0162*** 
Z-Wilcoxon -3.724 1.59 -4.514 -2.314 -6.78 
Panel C.          
 
 of firms with strong reporting incentives in 8 years around the IFRS adoption date 
Pre 
Obs 187 39 122 47 126 
Mean  0.0200 0.0259 0.0184 0.0309 0.0165 
Post 
Obs 300 51 171 109 202 
Mean  0.0181 0.0252 0.0133 0.0269 0.0137 
Post-Pre 
Dif. -0.0019 -0.0007 -0.0051** -0.0040 -0.0028** 
Z-Wilcoxon 1.44 0.313 -2.283 1.574 -2.44 
*, ** and *** indicate the statistical significance between means at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively, 
two-tailed test. In this table, we evaluate whether the dispersion of earnings forecasts for firms with 
strong reporting incentives is lower after the IFRS adoption in comparison to firms with weak reporting 
incentives.        equals one if one of a Big 4 auditor audits firm i in year t, otherwise is 0.         is 
the number of foreign stock markets that a firm i lists on.        is the ratio of net income over total 
assets.        is equal to total liabilities divided by total assets.         is the book to market value ratio.  
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   Table 5: Overall impact of Mandatory adoption of IFRS 
Independent  
Variables 
Pred. 
Sign 
Dependent Variables 
     
       
             
 
          
   
            
 
             
 
             
   
 
         
        -/+ -0.0472** 0.0736 -0.00782** 0.00893 -0.0328* 0.406*** 0.406*** 
  (-1.993) (0.872) (-2.106) (1.347) (-1.759) (4.954) (5.661) 
        -/+ 0.0311* -0.133 -0.00476* -0.0114* 0.00522 0.283*** 0.324*** 
  (1.698) (-1.290) (-1.836) (-1.710) (0.242) (3.203) (4.343) 
       + 0.0317 0.165 0.00623 0.0214** 0.0448***   
  (0.577) (1.547) (1.042) (2.049) (3.025)   
        +/- 0.602 0.320 0.00781 -0.0196 0.0475   
  (1.250) (0.852) (0.264) (-0.403) (0.309)   
            
 
 - -0.0109  0.00566***     
  (-0.949)  (2.776)     
             
 
 + 0.00287  -0.00268     
  (0.487)  (-1.137)     
            
   
 -  0.0126  0.000791    
   (1.603)  (0.995)    
             
   
 +  -0.0691  -0.00355    
   (-1.115)  (-0.231)    
              
 
 -     0.000410   
      (1.185)   
               
 
 +     0.0383*   
      (1.948)   
Fixed effects         
INDUSTRY  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
Constant  -0.206 1.347 0.0698** 0.119 -0.128 -1.656** -0.873 
  (-1.315) (1.647) (2.420) (1.318) (-0.942) (-2.346) (-1.597) 
         
Adjusted R-squared 0.115 0.084 0.044 0.046 0.038 0.192 0.216 
Observations  400 402 385 394 523 605 599 
Number of firms 98 96 94 96 110 115 112 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *, ** and *** indicate the statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. In this table, 
we use several regressions to evaluate whether          which is equal to 1 if the forecasts are derived after mandatory IFRS adoption 
and is equal to 0 otherwise, is significant in improving the analysts’ information environment.      
  is the absolute value of the mean 
of the forecast of earnings per share minus actual earnings per share divided by stock price at t-1 for current-year forecasts.      
    is 
the absolute value of the mean of the forecast of earnings per share minus actual earnings per share divided by stock price at t-1 for 
one-year ahead forecasts.          
 
 is the standard deviation of forecasts of earnings per share divided by stock price at t-1. 
         
   
 is the standard deviation of forecasts of one-year-ahead earnings per share divided by stock price at t-1.            
 
 The 
standard deviation of forecasts of target price per share divided by the absolute mean of current-year target price forecasts.  
            
 
 denotes the number of analysts following firm i that issues current-year forecast (the superscript t) in year t (the 
subscript t).             
   
 denotes the number of analysts following firm i that issues one-year-ahead forecasts (the superscript 
t+1) in year t (the subscript t).         is the log of the market value of equity.         is the change in reported earnings of firm i from 
year t-1 to t scaled by the share price in year t-1 (Liang and Riedl, 2014).     -  is the stock return of firm i in year t-1. 
             
 
 is the log of 1 plus the average number of days between the earnings forecast and the earnings announcement date, 
for firm i in year t.              
   
 is the log of 1 plus the average number of days between the earnings forecast and the earnings 
announcement date of year t+1.                 
 
 is the log of 1 plus the average number of days between each analysts’ forecast 
of target price, and target price of year t.               
 
 denotes the number of analysts following firm i that issues current-year 
target price forecast (the superscript t) in year t (the subscript t). 
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Table 6: The impact of firm-level reporting incentives on analysts’ information environment 
Independent 
Variables 
Pred.  
sign 
Dependent Variables 
     
       
             
 
          
   
            
 
             
 
             
   
 
         
       -/+ -0.0935 0.0140 0.0136 -0.0253 0.00140 -0.270 0.595*** 
  (-1.261) (0.0630) (1.342) (-1.282) (0.0309) (-1.184) (5.567) 
        +/- -0.00215 -0.0530 0.0106* 0.0162 -0.00625 0.318*** 0.220** 
  (-0.137) (-0.520) (1.873) (1.239) (-0.304) (2.640) (1.983) 
       -/+ -5.43e-05 0.0787 -0.000660 2.92e-05 -0.0147*** 0.0138 0.125 
  (-0.00784) (1.122) (-0.820) (0.00402) (-3.608) (0.522) (1.498) 
          -/+ -0.0193 -0.0394 -0.00385* 0.00429 0.0210 0.0594 0.000180 
  (-1.326) (-0.773) (-1.905) (0.895) (1.607) (0.645) (0.00793) 
       -/+ -0.289 -0.843 -0.0196 -0.127 -0.262*** -0.744 -0.524 
  (-1.147) (-0.893) (-0.835) (-1.575) (-3.671) (-1.245) (-0.975) 
        -/+ 0.0276 -0.103 -0.00140 -0.000453 0.00144 0.555*** 0.550*** 
  (1.307) (-1.064) (-0.425) (-0.0477) (0.0892) (6.063) (6.500) 
    ‐  + 0.0237 0.105 0.00721 0.0205** 0.0476***   
  (0.421) (1.338) (1.104) (2.074) (3.188)   
        -/+ 0.525 0.192 0.00788 -0.0659 -0.00430   
  (1.414) (0.453) (0.287) (-0.999) (-0.0288)   
            
 
 - -0.0369  0.000793     
  (-1.518)  (0.333)     
             
 
 + 0.00431  -0.00270     
  (0.786)  (-1.240)     
            
   
 -  0.0163  0.000502    
   (1.098)  (0.384)    
             
   
 +  -0.0724  0.00381    
   (-0.932)  (0.221)    
              
 
 -     7.19e-05   
      (0.273)   
               
 
 +     0.0260   
      (1.485)   
Fixed Effects         
INDUSTRY  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant  -0.132 1.348 0.0349 0.0168 0.0896 -2.617*** -2.429*** 
  (-0.979) (1.439) (1.087) (0.119) (0.649) (-3.560) (-3.572) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.102 0.130 0.038 0.110 0.094 0.146 0.151 
Observations  399 401 384 393 520 600 594 
Number of Firms 97 95 93 95 109 114 111 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *, ** and *** indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. In this table, we 
use several metrics to evaluate whether firms incentives denoted by       ,        ,       ,          and        are significant in 
improving the analysts’ information environment.        equals one if one of the Big 4 auditors audits firm i in year t, otherwise is 
0.         is the book to market value ratio.        is equal to total liabilities divided by total assets.          is the number of 
foreign stock markets that a firm i lists on.        is the ratio of net income over total assets.      
  is the absolute value of the mean of 
the forecast of earnings per share minus actual earnings per share divided by stock price at t-1 for current-year forecasts.      
    is the 
absolute value of the mean of the forecast of earnings per share minus actual earnings per share divided by stock price at t-1 for one-
year ahead forecasts.          
 
 is the standard deviation of forecasts of earnings per share divided by stock price at t-1.          
   
 is 
the standard deviation of forecasts of one-year-ahead earnings per share divided by stock price at t-1.            
 
 is the standard 
deviation of forecasts of target price per share divided by the absolute mean of current-year target price forecasts.              
 
 
denotes the number of analysts following firm i that issues current-year forecasts (the superscript t) in year t (the subscript 
t).             
   
 denotes the number of analysts following firm i that issues one-year-ahead forecasts (the superscript t+1) in year 
t (the subscript t).         is the log of the market value of equity.         is the change in reported earnings of firm i from year t-1 to t 
scaled by the share price in year t-1 (Liang and Riedl, 2014).     -  is the stock return of firm i in year t-1.              
 
 is the log 
of 1 plus the average number of days between the earnings forecast and the earnings announcement date, for firm i in year t. 
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 is the log of 1 plus the average number of days between the earnings forecast and the earnings announcement date 
of year t+1.                 
 
 is the log of 1 plus the average number of days between each analysts’ forecast of target price, and 
target price of year t.               
 
 denotes the number of analysts following firm i that issues current-year target price forecast 
(the superscript t) in year t (the subscript t). 
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Table 7. Impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on analysts’ information environment after controlling for firm-level 
reporting incentives 
Independent 
variables 
Pred. 
Sign 
Dependent Variables 
     
       
             
 
          
   
            
 
             
 
             
   
 
         
        -/+ -0.0487** 0.0687 -0.00877** 0.00784 -0.0528*** 0.380*** 0.406*** 
  (-1.962) (0.922) (-2.475) (1.227) (-3.139) (4.676) (5.664) 
       -/+ -0.0878 0.0314 0.0159 0.0193 -0.0357 0.0285 0.0689 
  (-1.198) (0.132) (1.462) (1.273) (-0.754) (0.120) (0.434) 
        +/- 0.00778 -0.0634 0.0129** 0.0150 0.00984 0.173* 0.0614 
  (0.499) (-0.679) (2.195) (1.331) (0.476) (1.680) (0.648) 
       -/+ -0.000614 -0.0378 -0.000821 0.00449 -0.0156*** 0.0121 -0.00176 
  (-0.0722) (-0.889) (-0.831) (1.124) (-4.021) (0.711) (-0.118) 
          -/+ -0.0204 0.111 -0.00462** 0.00374 -0.0123 -0.205 0.356*** 
  (-1.249) (1.091) (-2.213) (0.422) (-0.595) (-0.393) (4.342) 
       -/+ -0.322 -0.797 0.00694 0.0214** -0.325*** 0.253*** 0.0229 
  (-1.189) (-0.993) (1.088) (2.419) (-5.168) (2.786) (0.0499) 
        -/+ 0.0442 -0.122 0.00212 -0.00258 0.0220 0.372*** 0.356*** 
  (1.555) (-1.224) (0.626) (-0.292) (1.205) (4.164) (4.415) 
       + 0.0238 0.113 -0.0304 -0.122* 0.0463***   
  (0.432) (1.522) (-1.129) (-1.803) (3.059)   
        +/- 0.516 0.191 0.00679 -0.0655 0.00899   
  (1.417) (0.519) (0.233) (-1.166) (0.0621)   
            
 
 - -0.00378  0.000525     
  (-1.255)  (1.032)     
             
 
 + 0.00429  -0.00287     
  (0.814)  (-1.365)     
            
   
 -  0.0105  -0.000169    
   (1.268)  (-0.161)    
             
   
 +  -0.0717  0.00395    
   (-0.997)  (0.226)    
              
 
 -     0.000382   
      (1.485)   
               
 
 +     0.0301*   
      (1.815)   
Fixed Effects         
INDUSTRY  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant  -0.265 1.449 -0.00320 0.00137 -0.0416 -1.408** -1.149* 
  (-1.373) (1.513) (-0.108) (0.0104) (-0.263) (-2.052) (-1.842) 
         
Adjusted R-squared 0.123 0.137 0.056 0.1151 0.125 0.210 0.223 
Observations  399 401 384 393 520 600 594 
Number of Firms 97 95 93 95 109 114 111 
   Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *, ** and *** indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. In this table, 
we use several metrics to evaluate whether          which is equal to 1 if the forecasts are derived after mandatory IFRS adoption 
and is equal to 0 otherwise, is significant in improving the analysts’ information environment after controlling for firms’ incentives. 
     
  is the absolute value of the mean of the forecast of earnings per share minus actual earnings per share divided by stock price at 
t-1 for current-year forecasts.      
    is the absolute value of the mean of the forecast of earnings per share minus actual earnings per 
share divided by stock price at t-1 for one-year ahead forecasts.          
 
 is the standard deviation of forecasts of earnings per 
share divided by stock price at t-1.         
   
 is the standard deviation of forecasts of one-year-ahead earnings per share divided by 
stock price at t-1.           
 
 The standard deviation of forecasts of target price per share divided by the absolute mean of current-
year target price forecasts.              
 
 denotes the number of analysts following firm i that issues current-year forecasts (the 
superscript t) in year t (the subscript t).             
   
 denotes the number of analysts following firm i that issues one-year-ahead 
forecasts (the superscript t+1) in year t (the subscript t).        equals one if one of the Big 4 auditors audits firm i in year t, 
otherwise is 0.         is the book to market value ratio.        is equal to total liabilities divided by total assets.          is the 
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number of foreign stock markets that a firm i lists on.        is the ratio of net income over total assets.         is the log of the 
market value of equity.         is the change in reported earnings of firm i from year t-1 to t scaled by the share price in year t-1 
(Liang and Riedl, 2014).     -  is the stock return of firm i in year t-1.              
 
 is the log of 1 plus the average number of 
days between the earnings forecast and the earnings announcement date, for firm i in year t.              
   
 is the log of 1 plus 
the average number of days between the earnings forecast and the earnings announcement date of year t+1.                 
 
 is 
the log of 1 plus the average number of days between each analysts’ forecast of target price, and target price of year 
t.               
 
 denotes the number of analysts following firm i that issues current-year target price forecasts (the superscript 
t) in year t (the subscript t). 
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Table 8:  The impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on analysts’ public, private and consensus information 
                                              
1 
d 1
   
    
        
5
c 1
      
Independent variables 
Pred.           
Sign 
Dependent variables 
                                  
     
        + 0.191** -0.117 0.383*** 
  (1.998) (-1.362) (3.600) 
        +/? 0.0214 -0.0360* 0.0467* 
  (1.171) (-1.941) (1.860) 
Constant  -0.124** 0.0763 -0.222* 
  (-1.991) (1.360) (-1.716) 
     
Fixed Effects     
INDUSTRY  YES YES YES 
COUNTRY  YES YES YES 
     
Adjusted R-squared  0.007 0.002 0.013 
Observations  476 476 476 
Number of firms  93 93 93 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *, ** and *** indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.              is 
a common variable that denotes          ,           , and            , which represent the precision of public, private and all 
available (consensus) information (Barron et al., 1998).         is a dummy that equals to 1 for the IFRS period, otherwise zero.  
        is the natural logarithm of market value of equity at the end of year t.  
 
 
Appendix 1: Questionnaire 
 
Please answer the following questions Reference 
ENFORCEMENT Adapted from 
1) Did the security market regulator or other body monitor financial reporting of public 
companies in 200921?  
Brown et al. 
(2014) 
2) Has this situation changed since the mandatory IFRS adoption in 2010? If yes, please specify, 
and provide a particular month and year when the change happened. For example, the regulator 
was not responsible for this role before IFRS, however after the mandatory adoption of IFRS the 
regulator became responsible for it, or the regulator appointed a consultant to do this work. 
3) If there is a regulator monitoring the compliance behaviour of a firm after mandatory 
adoption of IFRS, how many firms did not comply with IFRS in the post mandatory adoption 
period (for example in 2011 and 2012)? 
Hope (2003)-
Rule of Law 
4) What are the consequences for firms' noncompliance behaviours with the financial reporting 
and auditing requirements (e.g., fines, loss of limited liability status, loss of licenses, prison 
sentences for managers, claims for reparation by shareholders or others)? 
World Bank 
(2008) 
5) Which legislation outlines/presents the consequences (e.g., in the Acts or Codes, in a civil 
code, criminal code, capital markets legislation, stock exchange listing rules, etc.)? 
6) Have there been any changes at the above legislation(s) concerning the consequences of 
noncompliance since IFRS adoption? If yes, please specify. 
7) Has the regulator taken judicial action against a firm for a non-compliant financial statement? 
If yes, how many times during each individual year between 2009 and 2012? If not, please 
specify the reason. 
Hope (2003)-
Rule of Law 
8) Has there been any increase in the number of staff employed by the regulator or monitoring 
body in order to enhance the enforcement of IFRS? If yes, could you specify a particular month 
Brown et al. 
(2014) 
                                               
21 The date of each question is adjusted for each country according to the official IFRS adoption date. 
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and year when the hires took place? 
INVESTOR PROTECTION   
9) What kind of voting mechanism does your country adopt? How does it work (for example, 
the shareholder's number of votes is equal to his number of shares, or there is a distinction 
between shares, or shareholders that have older shares have higher number of votes)? 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) and 
Hope (2003) - 
Shareholder 
Protection 
10) Is a shareholder able to vote through the mail? 
11) In order to be eligible to vote, does a shareholder need to deposit his shares in the company 
prior to a shareholder meeting, ensuring that the shares temporarily cannot be sold? 
12) Is there any legal regulation allowing the minority shareholders to challenge the directors' 
decision in the court? If yes, please specify. 
13) What is the minimum percentage of share capital needed in order to call for an extraordinary 
shareholder meeting? 
14) Is there any regulation regarding the minimum mandatory dividend percentage to be 
distributed to shareholders? If yes, please specify. 
15) Have there been any changes on the outlined voting and protection mechanisms after IFRS 
adoption? If yes, please specify which changes were made and the particular month and year 
they took place. 
16) Has the level of shareholder protection been improved since mandatory IFRS adoption? If 
yes, please specify how it has improved and provide the particular month and year that the 
improvement was made. 
17) How many insider trading events were caught by the regulator in each individual year 
between 2009 and 2012? 
Hope (2003) - 
Insider Trading 
Laws 
18) Did the regulator take further actions to court? If yes, please indicate. If no, please explain 
why. 
19) Have these insiders been convicted? If yes, how many were convicted in each individual 
year between 2009 and 2012? 
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Appendix 2: Results of the questionnaire 
QUESTIONS COUNTRIES 
ENFORCEMENT ARGENTINA BRAZIL CHILE MEXICO PERU 
1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2) No No No No No 
3) None Please refer to footnote 1 
Many firms, but an 
exact statistic was not 
provided 
NA 
3 firms and 1 auditor's firm for 
providing inaccurate evidence of a 
firm's financial statement 
4) 
Fines and charges, 
however shareholders 
need to prosecute 
managers in order to 
claim for refunds and/or 
for the manager to go to 
prison 
Fines, charges, manager can 
be temporary suspended 
Fines and charges Fines and charges Fines and charges 
5) 
Law N. 26.832. 
(Legislación y normas 
de Mercado de 
Capitales) 
Law N. 6.385/76, art. 11 
Law N. 3538. (Ley 
Orgánica de la 
Superintendencia de 
Valores y Seguros) 
Law of Stock 
Markets/05 (Ley del 
Mercado de 
Valores/2005) 
Norm. CONASEV N° 0055-2001 
6) No No No No No 
7) NA Please refer to footnote 2 
None, only before the 
IFRS adoption and the 
number of firms has not 
been informed 
NA 
Only 1 in 2010, prior to the IFRS 
adoption 
8) No 
In January 2012, there was 
an increment of 3 staff 
members, but they were 
relocated to other roles in 
due course  
No NA 1 in July 2014 
 
INVESTOR PROTECTION ARGENTINA BRAZIL CHILE MEXICO PERU 
9) One-Share-One-Vote One-Share-One-Vote One-Share-One-Vote One-Share-One-Vote One-Share-One-Vote 
10) No No Yes No Yes 
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11) Yes No No No No 
12) 
Yes, Law of Societies 
(Ley de Sociedades) N. 
19.550/84 establishes 
5% 
Yes, Law N. 6.404/76, art 
159 defines 5% of minimum 
share capital 
Art. 133 of Law of 
Public Societies (Ley 
sobre Sociedades 
Anonimas) establishes 
5% 
Yes, Law of Stock 
Markets (Ley de 
Mercado de Valores), 
art. 36 establishes that 
5% of shares are 
required to start a 
prosecution against the 
director 
Yes, Law of Societies (Ley General de 
Sociedades) N. 26887/97, art 219. 
However, it does not define a 
minimum percentage of share capital 
13) 
60% in a first call, and 
30% in a second call 
10% 10% 
Unless defined in the 
statute, it is required 
75% of the shareholders 
20% according to art. 117 of Law of 
Societies (Ley General de Sociedades 
- Ley N. 26887/97) 
14) No 
Yes. Law N. 6404/76 
establishes 25% 
Yes. Art 79 of Law of 
Public Societies defines 
30%  
Yes, 5%. According to 
Art. 113, 2nd paragraph 
of General Law of 
Societies (Ley General 
de Sociedades 
Mercantiles) and art. 
117, 6th paragraph of 
Law of Stock Markets 
(Ley de Mercado de 
Valores) 
Yes, 50% if 20% of the shareholders 
demand for it 
15) No No No No No 
16) No No No No No 
17) NA Please refer to footnote 3 32 NA NA 
18) NA 
No. Because it is not a 
responsibility of the 
regulator. It is a duty of the 
Public Ministry of Brazil. 
No. Because it is not a 
responsibility of the 
regulator. 
NA NA 
19) NA Please refer to footnote 4 NA NA NA 
NA: Not available;  
Footnote 1: 2010: 2, 2011: 3, 2012: 2, 2013: 4, 2014: 18, 2015: 12;    
Footnote 2: 2010: 2, 2011: 3, 2012: 2, 2013: 4, 2014: 18, 2015: 12; 
   
Footnote 3: 2009: 4, 2010: 9, 2011: 3, 2012: 8, 2013: 15; 
   
Footnote 4: The regulator caught the first case of insider trading in 2009, and the first conviction was only in November 2016. 
